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CASENOTE
WIN THE WAR BUT LOSE THE BATTLE: IS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LIABLE FOR
WASTE RESULTING FROM PRIVATE PRODUCTION OF CONTRACTED FOR WWII-ERA WAR
MATERIALS?
US. v. Shell Oil Co.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In U.S. v. Shell Oil Co., the Ninth Circuit determined the federal government's liability as an arranger
under CERCLA for pollution that was created by private parties acting under a contract with the federal
government during World War II. The case is unique because of the powers of the War Production Board
during the war to compel production and allocate the resources necessary to properly dispose of hazardous by-
products.
This case is important not only because of the amount of pollution, and the CERCLA liability that
follows. from other World War II and cold-war era military and private defense contractor facilities, but
because of the minimal existing case law that exists in this area.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
This appeal was the culmination of three lawsuitS2 involving liability under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).3 The plaintiffs, the United States and
the State of California, sued the defendant oil companies4 for cleanup of a Superfund site near Fullerton,
California contaminated with hazardous waste resulting from the production of aviation gasoline during World
War II. The oil companies counterclaimed against the United States alleging that the United States was liable
for the costs. 6 The lawsuits were brought in the Central District of California in 1993, 1995, and 1998,
respectively.
Aviation gasoline (avgas) is a blend of petroleum distillates and chemical additives, the most prevalent
being -alkylate." the production of which requires the use of sulfuric acid as a catalyst. After its use in the
.'alky lation** process the sulfuric acid was significantly less pure and could either be reprocessed for reuse or
could be dumped.9 Spent sulfuric acid could also be used to improve the effectiveness of other avgas additives
and to purify other refinery products.'o Spent sulfuric acid used in other refinery processes produced waste
294 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002). cert. denied 123 S.Ct. 850.
U ,S. v. Shell Oil Co.. 841 F. Supp. 962 (C.D. Cal. 1993): U.S.v. Shell Oil Co., 1995 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 19778 (C.D. Cal.
1995): US v. Shell Oil Co.. 13 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
42 U.S.C. § 9601 ei seq (2000).
Shell Oil Co.: Union Oil Co. of California: Atlantic Richfield Co.; Texaco. Inc.
Shell Oil Co.. 294 F.3d at 1045.
Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 1049.
9 d.
'
0 Id. at 1050.
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known as "acid sludge."" During World War II, the production of avgas increased dramatically, rising from
roughly 40,000 barrels per day in 1941 to 514,000 barrels per day in 1945.12 Correspondingly, sulfuric acid was
consumed at a much higher rate, rising from 24 million pounds in 1941 to 120 million pounds in 1944.'1
Because of the large increase in avgas production needed for World War II, spent sulfuric acid and acid sludge
were created from alkylation and other processes in quantities far greater than ever before.14
During World War II, the United States exercised significant control over the avgas production process
and its involved industries.' The War Production Board (WPB) was established in 1942 and created a
nationwide ranking system to identify scarce goods, prioritize their use, and facilitate their creation.16 The
Petroleum Administration for War (PAW) centralized the government's petroleum-related activities, made
policy determinations relating to the allocation of resources and the building of facilities, and had the authority
to issue production orders to refineries.' 7 Although these agencies had the authority to require the oil
companies to take specific actions and could seize the refineries if needed, they relied almost exclusively on
18
contractual agreements to purchase avgas.
The government attempted to maximize the production of avgas through the Planned Blending Program,
in which it assisted the oil companies' refineries in exchanging and blending the various required components to
maximize avgas production.' 9 The program did not exercise direct control over the production of avgas
components. controlling only their exchange and use after their production.2 0 Throughout the war the oil
companies designed and built their own facilities, maintained private ownership of the facilities, and managed
their own refinery operations.2'
During World War 11. there was a lack of available rail transport to ship spent acid and acid sludge from
the refineries to other facilities for reprocessing or reuse.2 2 On two occasions the government refused to
allocate materials to build two acid reprocessing facilities in California.2 3 By late 1944 and 1945, the oil
companies were producing so much spent acid and acid sludge that they could not reuse it all in their own
refineries and existing facilities for reprocessing were incapable of handling the volume of the waste.24 When
the \olume of acid b-product threatened the production of avgas at the refineries the companies dumped it.25
The government xas aw\are during World War II that avgas production results in acid wastes and that
increases in avgas production corresponded to increased acid wastes. 26 The government did take some actions
'7 28
to assist w\ith waste disposal. In 1945. the government leased a large storage tank in southern California.
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no evidence exists suggesting the United States was aware of disposal contracts between the oil companies and
McColl.2 9
The dumping site involved in this litigation is named the McColl site, named after the man who
contracted30 to receive spent acid and acid sludge from refineries near Los Angeles.3 ' He began accepting the
waste and dumping it in sumps on his property in 1942 and continued to accept waste until 1945. In the
1950's, McColl, with the assistance of the oil companies., filled and capped the waste sumps to allow residential
development nearby, despite the existence of 100,000 cubic yards of acid waste." The government began
removing the waste in 1990 at an eventual cost of nearly $100 million.3 4 This action was an attempt to recover
those costs under CERCLA.
The United States District Court for the Central District of California determined that about 12% of the
waste at the McColl site was spent sulfuric acid from the alkylation process and about 5.5% was acid sludge
that resulted from the treatment of government owned benzol.36 Of the remaining waste. most was acid sludge
that resulted from spent sulfuric acid used for non-avgas related processes.
The trial Court granted summary judgment for the United States and California on the issue of whether
the oil companies were subject to arranger liability under CERCLA, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).38 The
District Court also rejected the oil companies' claims that they were exempt for contamination on the grounds
that the contamination was caused by an "act of war." a CERCLA defense under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(2). 9 On
cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court ruled that the United States was liable as an arranger
under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) for non-benzol wastes dumped at the site.40 The United States conceded its status
as an arranger for the benzol-wastes that resulted from the processing of government-owned benzol. 4 ' The
District Court also held that the United States had waived its sovereign immunity to suit under 42 USC §
9620(a)(1 ).42
29 Id.
3o No contracts were found between Eli McColl and any defendant other than Shell. but the parties stipulated that the
McColl site contains waste from all parties. Id. n.2.




31Id. at 105 1.
SId.
38 Id. at 1048. "[A]ny person who by contract, agreement., or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment. or arranged
with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person. by
any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing
such hazardous substances . . . shall be liable for. .. all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government...." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)-(4)(A).
' Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1048. "There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person otherwise
liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance
and the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by . . .an act of war." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(2).
4 0 Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1048.
41 id
42 Id. "Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United States (including the executive, legislative. and
judicial branches of government) shall be subject to, and comply with, this chapter in the same manner and to the same
extent, both procedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under section 9607 of this
title." 42 USC § 9620(a)(1) (2000).
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At the conclusion of the full trial regarding the allocation of the cleanup costs, the District Court
allocated 100% of the cleanup costs for the non-benzol waste to the government based on several factors.43
First, the cleanup costs were properly seen as part of the war effort for which the American public itself should
pay." The second factor relied on by the District Court was the general refusal of the United States to make
tank cars available to the oil companies to transport the waste to northern California for reprocessing. 45 The
third fact relied on by the District Court was the refusal of the United States to allocate resources to build
reprocessing plants.46 In a later unpublished order, the District Court ruled that 100% of the cleanup costs for
the benzol waste should be allocated to the United States for the same reasons as the non-benzol waste.
The United States appealed, arguing the District Court erred in (1) ruling that 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1)
waives its' sovereign immunity; (2) ruling the United States is liable as an arranger for the non-benzol waste
under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3); and (3) allocating 100% of all cleanup costs to the United States under 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(f)(1). 4 8 The oil companies cross-appealed, arguing that the District Court erred in dismissing their claim
that they are exempt from CERCLA liability under the "act of war" defense in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(2)."9 The
State of California appealed only the "act of war" decision.
The Ninth Circuit ruled as follows: (1) the court affirmed the district court's decision waiving the
sovereign immunity of the United States; (2) the court reversed the district court's holding that the United States
is liable as an arranger for non-benzol wastes; (3) accordingly, the United States' appeal as to the apportionment
of the cleanup costs associated with the non-benzol waste was moot and all costs associated with its cleanup are
to the defendant- appellant oil companies; (4) the court upheld the district court's apportionment of all benzol-
related costs to the United States; and (5) the court upheld the district court's ruling that the oil companies are
not immune under the "act of war" defense.51
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. CERCLA and Sovereign Immunity
The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit unless it consents to be sued, and the terms of its
consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.: Furthermore., a waiver of
the United States' sovereign immunity cannot be implied; it must be "unequivocally expressed in statutory
text." 53 Additionally, a waiver of the federal government's sovereign immunity must be strictly construed in
favor of the United States. 54 Limitations and conditions upon which the federal government consents to be sued
must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied.55





48 Id. at 1048.
49 Id.
50Id.
si Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1048-49.
52 U.S. v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).
5 Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996).
54 US. v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 531 (1995).
5 Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 161 (1981).
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There is no question that the United States can be held liable under CERCLA. The Supreme Court
interpreted the language of 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1) 56 as an unambiguous waiver of the United States' sovereign
immunity in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co,5 7 holding that the waiver of the Federal Government's immunity
from suits for damages under § 120(a)(1) of CERCLA, as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1), "is doubtless an
'unequivocal expression' of the Federal Government's waiver of its own sovereign immunity, since [the
Supreme Court could not ] imagine any other plausible explanation for this unqualified language."58
The question at issue was whether this abrogation of its sovereign immunity extended to cleanup costs
related to non-federal facilities. The two circuit courts considering the issue of whether the sovereign immunity
abrogation contained in § 9620(a)(1) is limited to instances where the government has undertaken non-
governmental activities have found that the abrogation is coextensive with the scope of liability imposed by 42
U.S.C. § 9607.9
The Third Circuit, in FMC Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, was confronted by an argument by the
United States that the abrogation does not extend to federal regulatory actions that a non-governmental entity
could not undertake.6 0 The court, in concluding that is liable when the government engages in activities that
would make a private party liable if the private party enga ed in those types of activities, identified three
justifications for its decision relevant to the issue at hand. First, the court stated that its decision to extend the
abrogation is consistent with its CERCLA statutory interpretation approach, taking the plain language of the
statute to mean what it says.62
Second, the court argued that the narrow interpretation advocated by the government would be
"'inconsistent 'with CERCLA's broad remedial purposes, most importantly its essential purpose of making those
responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for
56 .. Each department, agency. and instrumentality of the United States (including the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of government) shall be subject to, and comply with, this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent,
both procedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under section 9607 of this title."
42 U.S.C. §9620(a)(1).
5 491 U.S. I (1989). Overturned on other grounds in Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (overruling its conclusion
that Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to abrogate states' sovereign immunity.)
5 Id. at 10.
i Shell Oil Co.. 294 F.3d at 1053 (citing East Bay Mum. Util. Dist. V US. Dept. of Commerce, 142 F.3d 479, 482 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) and FMC Corp v. US. Dept. of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833 (3rd Cir. 1993). The scope of liability under 42 U.S.C.§ 9607 is such: "Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set forth in
subsection (b) of this section-(1 ) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, (2) any person who at the time of
disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract. agreement. or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter
for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or
entity. at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous
substances, and (4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment
facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which
causes the incurrence of response costs. of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for--(A) all costs of removal or remedial
action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan; (B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national
contingency plan: (C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of
assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and (D) the costs of any health assessment or
health effects study carried out under section 9604(i) of this title." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
6o 29 F.3d 833. 839 (3rd Cir. 1994).
61 Id. at 840.
62 m.
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remedying the harmful conditions they created."' 63 The court stated that in light of CERCLA's purposes, the
United States should be made to internalize the cleanup costs that its actions impose on society and the
environment.64
Third, the court examined the enumerated defenses to liability contained in § 9607(b), which did not
contain the "regulatory" exception to liability asserted by the government. 65
In East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. US. Dept. of Commerce, the D.C. District Court was confronted by an
argument by the United States that the government would be liable when it exercised the sort of direct and
detailed control that renders a party an operator through contract and property arrangements but not when it
exercised identical control powers through coercive, administrative measures. 66 In rejecting the narrow
construction of the sovereign immunity waiver the court discussed three relevant justifications.67 First, the
court stated that the language of §9620(a)(1) does not on its face suggest a distinction between the exercise of
private and governmental powers.68 Second, the court identified that CERCLA's strong tendency to focus on
the substance of the entity's activities, rather than their form, is contrary to a narrow interpretation. 69 The court
noted that the disregard for the formal relationships between the potentially responsible party and the facility is
manifest in the very imposition of liability upon the category of "operators," whose role is defined functionally,
not in terms of "the legal structure of ownership."70 Finally, the court noted that 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(1)
'-confers a defense on 'all persons' 'for costs or damages as a result of actions taken or omitted in the course of
rendering care. assistance, or advice in accordance with the National Contingency Plan,' but does 'not preclude
liability for costs or damages as the result of negligence." 7 1 The court stated that as it appears that such
activities are primarily or exclusively governmental, the creation of the defense suggests a congressional
assumption that immunization of specific and purely governmental activities required a specific provision.
However, the D.C. Circuit expressly noted that they do not rely at all on the argument that CERCLA's remedial
nature does not warrant a broad governmental nature, noting the Circuit's expressed doubts about the canon that
remedial statutes are to be construed broadly.7 3
Hloxever. this view is not unanimous. At least one District Court has ruled that §9620(a) is not a waiver
of sovereign immunity. The U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina held that CERCLA
contemplates that a governmental agency may be held liable under its provisions if the agency did indeed act as
an owner. operator. generator. or transporter of hazardous substances, but that § 9620(a), however, has not
generally been read as a waiver of sovereign immunity.74
i/. (quoting Lansford-CoalddeJoint 1Water Auth. V Tonolli Corp.. 4 F.3d 1209. 1221 (3rd Cir. 1993)).
FIC Corp.. 29 F.3d at 840-41.
Id. at 841.
66142 F.3d 479. 482 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
' Id. at 482-83.





Id. at 484. See Ober, United TravelAgenc. Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 135 F.3d 822, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Richland-Lexington Airport Dist. v. Atlas Properties. hc.., 854 F. Supp. 400, 414 (D.S.C. 1994). See also US. v.
Western Processing Co., 761 F. Supp. 725. 728 (W.D.Wash. 1991); B.R. Mackay & Sons v. US., 633 F. Supp. 1290, 1296
n. 9 (D. Utah 1986).
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B. CERCLA Arranger Liability
Under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), a party can be held liable for the costs of cleaning up a hazardous waste site
if that party, by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for the disposal or treatment, or arranged with a
transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person,
by any other party or entity, at any facility owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such
hazardous substances.75
There is general agreement among courts that a private party who contracts for the disposal of hazardous
wastes at a site is liable for the costs associated with the cleanup of that site. However, there is no general
consensus on the federal government's liability as an arranger for waste resulting from the production of a
product that it contracted for. As such, it is necessary to examine the different approaches various courts have
taken.
One circuit court has held that the United States is liable for cleanup costs for contamination from a site
where a facility had been operating under federal contract. In FMC Corp. v. US. Dept. of Commerce. the
Third Circuit affirmed without comment the district court's ruling that held the government liable as an arranger
for its actions in connection with a facility used during World War II for the production of high-tenacity
rayon.77 The District Court's ruling found the government liable as an arranger for ten reasons:78 (1) required
the facility to produce specified, increased quantities of high-tenacity rayon and to convert and expand its plant
to fulfill these production requirements; (2) exercised active control and hands-on participation in the facility's
conversion and expansion, and supplied government-owned equipment to the facility; (3) controlled raw
materials required for production of high-tenacity rayon yam, caused those materials to be supplied to the
facility, and controlled their use throughout the process; (4) participated in obtaining a labor force at the facility
and in constructing housing for that labor force; (5) maintained a presence at the facility. and through
continuous informal contacts and communications, as well as through formal contracts and communications,
was directly and substantially involved with the facility's production activities and management; (6) was
involved in developing and providing specifications for high-tenacity rayon yam and in requiring the disclosure
of confidential information to other producers and the government; (7) defined and controlled the market and
end uses of high-tenacity rayon yarn produced at the facility; (8) controlled the price of the high-tenacity rayon
produced at the facility and the profit of the facility; (9) required and received extensive information relating to
virtually all aspects of the facility; and (10) knew or should have known that the disposal or treatment of
hazardous substances was inherent in the manufacture of high-tenacity rayon yarn and that its production
requirements caused a significant increase in the amount of hazardous substances generated and disposed of at
the facility. 79 As a result of these findings of fact, the court concluded that the government owned and operated
the facility, and arranged for the disposal or treatment of hazardous substances at the facility.80
An Eighth Circuit case not involving the government is nonetheless useful because the court found a
third party liable for contamination created by another party due to the contractual relationship between the two
parties.81 In Aceto, the court approved of the plaintiffs' argument that because the generation of pesticide-
" 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
7 29 F.3d 833 (3rd Cir. 1994).
" Id. at 834.
1 FMC Corp., 786 F. Supp. at 476-85. The in depth recitation of the court's reasoning, while possibly tedious, is
necessary because of the limited case law existing in this area, and because of the very large degree to which resolution of
these issues are especially fact-specific. - Author's emphasis.
79 FMC Corp., 786 F. Supp. at 476-85.
s0 Id. at 486.
US. v. AcetoAgr. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
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containing wastes is inherent in the pesticide formulation process, the third party could not formulate the
alleged arranger's pesticides without wasting and disposing of some portion of them.82 Therefore, the court
ruled that alleged arranger could not have hired the third party to formulate their pesticides without also
"arranging for" the disposal of the waste. 83
However, case law also exists supporting the position that the government is not an arranger for
contracting for or otherwise directing production at a facility that generates hazardous wastes. The Eighth
Circuit ruled in US. v. VERTAC Chem. Corp.84 that the United States was not an arranger for contamination
from a facility that had contracted with the United States to produce the pesticide Agent Orange.8 5 The court
justified its decision on the grounds that the facts simply did not support the conclusion that the United States
actually or constructively supplied the facility with its raw materials. 6 The court found that it could not
reasonably be inferred that the United States constructively owned or possessed the raw materials or the work in
process that generated hazardous wastes at the facility, and the undisputed facts established that the United
States' actual involvement in the operations of the facility was sporadic and minimal.
A California district court ruled that the government was not liable as an arranger for contamination
caused by mining simply by contracting to purchase the mined materials.8 8 The court made its judgment based
on the lack of allegations that the government possessed the polluting waste or that the government managed
the disposal of the waste. 89
Additionally, a federal district court has ruled that the government's allocation of raw materials to a
producer of poison gas during World War II did not establish liability against the United States as an arranger
for any contamination created by that producer through the use of those raw materials.90
C. CERCLA and Act of War
Section 107(b)(2) of CERCLA provides an exemption from liability for an otherwise liable party where
the defendant can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release was "caused solely by ... an act
of war."91 The term "act of war" is undefined in CERCLA and, though familiar from common usage, does not
disclose its parameters on its face. Nor is there any precedent clearly defining the term.92 Recent caselaw
evidences a habit of merely using the term as a conclusory label.93
Earlier caselaw provides more guidance as to the proper construction of "act of war." First, the seizure
or capture of property belonging to or benefiting an enemy nation has been authoritatively distinguished from
situations in which there is some element of contractual relationship--i.e., an express or implied agreement to
82 Id. at 1383.
83 Id.
' 46 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 1995).
8 Id. at 811.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 US. v. Iron Mountain Mines, 881 F. Supp. 1432 (E.D. Cal. 1995).8 1 d. at 1451-52.
90 ElfAtochemN. Am. v. US., 914 F. Supp. 1166, 1171 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
9' 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(2).
92 US. v. Shell Oil Co., 841 F.Supp. 962 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (overturned on other grounds).
9 See e.g., Koohi v. US., 976 F.2d 1328, 1334 (9th Cir.1992) (shooting down of Iranian passenger jet by United States
constituted an act of war); Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80, 97 n. 12, 115 (D.C. Cir.1980) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting)
(seizure by Iranians of United States embassy in Tehran characterized as an act of war).
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compensate the owner--in the government's use or possession of property. 94
Second, a helpful line of decisional law arose in the wake of the Civil War as a consequence of the
Court of Claims' determination of "acts of war" for which the federal government could not be held liable. The
court distinguished cases in which the government appropriated property in order to supply the military, which
were compensable, from cases in which the government seized or destroyed property for the purpose of injuring
or weakening the enemy, which were not.95
In the realm of international law, the term is defined clearly as a "use of force or other action by one
state against another" which "U the state acted against recognizes ... as an act of war, either by use of retaliatory
force or a declaration of war."
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The United States presented three arguments on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: (1) the
United States' waiver of sovereign immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1) is limited to nongovernmental
activities; (2) the district court erred in holding the United States liable as an arranger for the non-benzol waste
under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3); and (3) the district court erred in holding the United States liable under 42 U.S.C.§ 9613(f)(1) for 100% of the cleanup costs for all of the wastes. The Oil Companies, joined by the State of
California., argued that the district court erred in rejecting their argument that they were exempt from liability
under the -act of war" provision of 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(2). The court addressed each of these claims.
A. Sovereign Immunity
The court began its analysis with a discussion of the general requirement that a plaintiff suing the United
States must point to an "unequivocal expression" of intent to waive sovereign immunity.97 The court stressed
that a waiver of sovereign immunity must be unambiguous, and that the relevant statutory language is to be
strictly construed in favor of the sovereign state. 98
The court disagreed with the United States' narrow construction of 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1). First, the
court rejected the United States" claim that the statutory placement of the waiver in a section entitled "Federal
facilities" implies that the waiver only applies to federally-owned facilities, and therefore exempts the United
States from liability for actions involving non-governmental facilities. 99 The court observed that nowhere in the
text of § 9620(a)(1) is a provision limiting the waiver to federally-owned facilities.100 The court next observed
that the waiver language was enacted in 1980, while the "Federal facilities" portion of CERCLA was enacted in
1986.101 Additionally. the court noted that when the waiver provision was moved to the "Federal facilities"
94 See. e.g.. Juragua Iron Co. v. U.S.. 212 U.S. 297, 308 (1909) (no act of war where agreement to pay for use of property
may be implied): US. v. Winchester & Potomac River Co., 163 U.S. 244, 255, (1896) (distinguishing seizure with no
implication of compensation of railroad used for benefit of Confederacy, which constituted an "act of war," from situation
where property is taken or used by federal government under an implied agreement that owner should be compensated).
See. e.g.. White v. US.. 33 Ct. Cl. 368, 375 (1898) (distinguishing between appropriation of stores and supplies for the
use of the military from the "destruction of property as an act of war"); Conardand Tiventy Others v. U.S., 25 Ct. Cl. 433,
436-37 (1890) (taking of property properly characterized as act of war where primary purpose was not to supply the
military, but rather to injure enemy): Beasely v. US., 21 Ct. Cl. 225, 227 (1886).
James R. Fox. Dictionary of International and Comparative Law 6 (1992).
9 Shell Oil Co.. 294 F.3d at 1051.
98 Id. See Lane v. Pena. 518 U.S. 187. 192 (1996).
9 Shell Oil Co.. 294 F.3d at 1052.
00 Id.
'0 Id. at 1052-53.
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section it contained language that referred without qualification to the liability-creating portion of CERCLA
without adding new language limiting the scope of the waiver.1 02 The court concluded that the already-existing
waiver was placed under the "Federal facilities" heading for organizational purposes only.'03
The second reason the court rejected the United States' construction of the waiver provision limiting its
liability to non-governmental actions was because of numerous past actions in which the United States has been
held liable under CERCLA for acts that cannot be considered nongovernmental acts, specifically liability for
cleanups involving military installations and activities.104
The court ruled that CERCLA's waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity is coextensive with the
scope of liability imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 9607.1o5
B. Arranger Liability for Non-Benzol Waste
The court next examined the argument of the United States that the district court wrongly imposed
liability on the United States on the grounds that it was an arranger with respect to the non-benzol waste at the
McColl site. The court examined this issue in two different respects: (1) whether the United States was an
arranger under a traditional direct arranger test used by the district court; and (2) whether the United States was
an arranger under a broader theory of arranger liability proposed by the oil companies.
1. Traditional Direct Arranger Liability
The court recognized the traditional arranger test imposes liability on a party to a transaction if the
primary purpose of the transaction is to arrange for the treatment or disposal of the hazardous wastes.'
0o The
court also recognized that a direct arranger must have direct involvement in arrangements for the disposal of
waste." 7 The court noted that the oil companies did not argue for direct liability under this theory, but that the
District Court raised the argument on its own. 08 The court rejected the district court's finding that sufficient
facts existed to support a conclusion that the United States directly entered into arrangements to dispose of acid
waste at the McColl site.""'
2. Broader Arranger Liability
The court recognized that control is a crucial element of whether a party is an arranger under 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(3). but conceded that there is no bright-line test in statute or case law for the broad theory of arranger
liability.'o The court stated that liability would be determined by comparing the facts of the case at bar with
the facts of previously decided cases.''" The court examined four cases: U.S. v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp.;112
I/. at 1053.
o0 Id.
" Id.: See U.S. i..-1//iedCorp.. 1990 L.S.Dist. LEXIS 20061 at *7-9 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
o Shell Oil Co.. 294 F.3d at 1053.
106 Id. at 1054.





1 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
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US. v. NE. Pharm. & Chem. Co. (NEPACCO);" 3 FMC Corp. v. US. Dept. of Commerce;'14 and US v.
Vertac. 11.16
The court distinguished the current case from Aceto, "7 a case relied on by the oil companies and the
district court, in which pesticide manufacturers were held to be arrangers for pollution resulting from production
of pesticides for three crucial differences in their respective fact patterns. First, in the current case the United
States was the end purchaser of the avgas, and not the manufacturer, as were the pesticide manufacturers in
Aceto.119 Second, in the current situation, unlike the pesticide manufacturers in Aceto, the United States never
owned any of the raw materials and or intervening products.1 20 Finally, unlike the manufacturers, the United
States did not contract out a crucial and waste-producing intermediate step in a manufacturing process, and then
seek to disclaim responsibility for the waste generated during that step. 121 Because of the differences between
the parties' situations in Aceto and the current case, Aceto does not control.122
The court also distinguished the facts of the current case from those of NEPACCO.'2 3 The court
determined that NEPACCO holds that responsible officials in the chain of command of a corporation may be
held responsible as arrangers when one of those officers has exercised actual control over the disposition of
waste on behalf of the corporation, and the other officer has the authority to control the first officer.' 24 In the
current case the waste was never owned by the United States, so there was never a United States employee in
control, in the ownership sense, of the waste as there was in NEPACCO.12 Furthermore, a NEPACCO
employee exercised actual control over the waste, whereas no United States official or employee ever exercised
any actual control over any of the waste in issue in this case. 26 The court concluded that NEPACCO does not
apply because the United States neither exercised actual control, nor had the direct ability to control the
waste. 127
In FMC Corp.,' 28 the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, was evenly divided over whether or not the United
States acted as an arranger with respect to pollution at a facility used to create high tenacity rayon during World
War 11.129 However, the United States exercised a much greater level of control over the rayon production in
FMC Corp. than it did over avgas production in the current case, installing government owned rayon-
manufacturing machinery in the plants and creating acid production facilities adjoining the manufacturing
1 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
114 29 F.3d 833 (3rd Cir. 1994) (en banc).
"546 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 1995).
116 Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1055-59.
"'Aceto, 872 F.2d 1373.
... Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1055-56.




123 Id. The Court disagreed with the interpretation of NEPACCO relied upon by the oil companies and the District Court
that mere authority to control is sufficient. Id. at 1057. The Court recognized that if this interpretation of NEPACCO
controls the United States would be liable as an arranger, because at that time the United States did have ultimate





128 29 F.3d 833.
129 Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1058.
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facility.130 The court recognized that if it was a close question for the Third Circuit on the facts of FMC Corp.
whether the United States was an arranger, then with the lower level of involvement in the current case the
United States could not be considered an arranger.131
Finally, the court compared the facts of Vertac, 32 in which the United States was held to not be an
arranger for its involvement in the production of the pesticide Agent Orange, with the facts of the current
situation.133 The court noted many similarities between the facts of the two cases: (1) in both cases the
products were manufactured for purchase by the United States in wartime; (2) in both cases the manufacturing
was carried out under government contracts and pursuant to government programs that gave it priority over
other manufacturing; (3) both companies voluntarily entered into the contracts and profited from the sale; and
(4) in both cases the United States was aware that waste was being produced, but did not direct the manner in
which the companies disposed of it.134 The court recognized that the government's involvement in the avgas
production was somewhat greater than in the Agent Orange production, but determined that the facts were
sufficiently similar to apply the reasoning and ruling of the Vertac Court.135
Based on the comparisons of the facts of the current case with the facts of Aceto, NEPA CCO, FMC
Corp., and Vertac, the Court determined that the United States was not an arranger under 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a)(3) with respect to non-benzol waste, even under a broad theory of arranger liability.' 6 Because the
United States was not an arranger under CERCLA, the court ruled that it has no liability for the cleanup costs
for non-benzol wastes.137
C. Liability for Benzol Waste
The United States argued on appeal that the district court erred in allocating 100% of the cleanup costs
of the benzol waste to the government. 38 The court first recognized that CERCLA provides that the district
court "may allocate response costs among the liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines
are appropriate."' 39 Furthermore, the court stated that the language of CERCLA gives district courts discretion
to decide what factors ought to be considered, as well as the duty to allocate costs according to these factors.14 0
Finally, the court stated that they have the power to reverse the district court's decision "only for the abuse of
the discretion to select factors, or for clear error in the allocation according to the factors."l 4 1
The court upheld the decision of the district court with respect to the allocation of the cleanup costs of
the benzol waste. 14 The court ruled that the district court was justified in extending its non-benzol waste
allocation, in which the United States was allocated with 100% of the costs, to benzol-waste.14 3 The court
recognized that to the degree the equitable factors supported allocation of the non-benzol waste costs the United
States, where liability as an arranger was disputed, the factors are even stronger with respect to the benzol
130 Id.
132 46 F.3d 803.
"' Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1058-59.
134 Id. at 1059.
136 id
' Id. at 1059-60.
Id. at 1060 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2000)).
140 Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d at 1060.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 1060-61.
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waste, where the United States conceded that it was an arranger.144 Because the court found that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in choosing which equitable factors to use to determine allocation, and because
it did not clearly err in applying those factors to benzol waste, the court upheld the decision of the district court
allocating 100% of the cleanup costs associated with benzol waste to the United States.
D. Act of War
The final argument addressed by the court was whether the oil companies enjoyed a defense to liability
under CERCLA because the government's activities in regulating wartime petroleum production constitutes an
"act of war" under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(2).1 45 The court recognized that minimal authority exists involving the
issue, with-the statute silent regarding a definition of "act of war" and no case law addressing the defense.
The court upheld the district court's rejection of the application of the defense by the oil companies for
three reasons. All of these reasons were apparently persuasive to the court, although it did not discuss the
relative merits of one argument compared with the others.
First, the court determined that "act of war" should be applied narrowly.147 The court approved the
district court's holding that since CERCLA used broad language to define liability but narrow language to
define defenses, any definition of "act of war" should be applied narrowly. 4 8 The court also followed the
district court's recognition that the legislative history of CERCLA, while not explaining the "act of war"
defense, did emphasize that CERCLA was to be a strict liability statute with narrowly construed exceptions.149
Furthermore, the court discussed the academic discourse on the definition of "act of war" as applies to
international law, which suggested a narrow definition of "act of war."1so All of these grounds for interpreting
"act of war" narrowly apparently create a situation where the court decides to apply the defense narrowly,
although it did not list any factual justifications for its decision.
Next. the court recognized a distinction between the acts of two mutually contracting parties and a
unilateral act of the government. The court specifically discussed the Supreme Court case of Farbwerke
Vormals Meister Lucius & Bruning v. Chem. Found.,'" in which the Court characterized, in dictum, the United
States' wartime seizure and assignment of German-owned patents as "acts of war," contrasting that action with
acts of mutually contracting parties.15 2 The court impliedly recognized the contractual relationship between the
United States and the Oil Companies at the time of the dumping and the absence of coercion by the government.
Finally. the court held that the oil companies could not show that their actions were caused "solely" by
an act of war. as required by the statute.'13 The defense of "act of war" did not apply to the oil producers
because: (1) the oil companies had other disposal methods available to them at the time; (2) they dumped acid
waste both before and after the war; (3) they dumped acid waste from operations unrelated to avgas production
at the McColl site: and (4) they were not compelled by the government to dump waste in a specified manner. 154
.. Id. at 1060.
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V. COMMENT
In U.S. v. Shell Oil Co., the Ninth Circuit held that although the waiver of the United States' sovereign
immunity under CERCLA was coextensive with the scope of liability imposed by the statute, 5 5 the United
States was not liable for the disposal of wastes created by third parties from the manufacturing of materials for
the United States under a contract.' 56
The first step the court took in reaching this conclusion was that CERCLA's waiver of sovereign
immunity extended beyond exclusively non-governmental activities to nonfederal facilities. This was the only
logical conclusion that the court could have reached, and to hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of
CERCLA. The Supreme Court has held that the section of CERCLA that imposes liability on the federal
government in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity, 42 U.S.C. §9620(a)(1),
is an unambiguous waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity. 5 7 There is no additional language that
contradicts this statement. The claim that the federal government is liable to a lesser degree than a private actor
is plainly contrary to the statute and was properly discarded by the Court.
The second step that the court had to take, after deciding that the federal government could be held
liable. was whether the government had met the statutory requirements of an arranger of the waste.
Interestingly. the court declined to adopt or create a bright line test for non-traditional arranger liability. In
comparing the facts of the current case to those of previously decided federal appellate cases, the court
determined that the facts most closely resembled those of the Eighth Circuit case of US. v. Vertac Chem.
Corp.'58 Therefore. to the extent that waste was created by third parties manufacturing products under
voluntary contract with the federal government, so long as the government does not direct the manner in which
the waste is disposed of. the federal government will not be liable as an arranger for that waste.
The ruling can only be rationally applied to situations in which the government has assumed oversight
and prospective control over manufacturing and transportation. In the post-World War II era the government
has exponentially less control over the manufacturing and transportation processes of private enterprises. In the
WWII-era cases examined by the court the manufacturers could have transported the waste to other locations
for proper disposal only if the governmental gave its approval, because of the large restrictions on
transportation. A credible argument could be made that the government did control the disposal of the waste by
not allowing the companies the resources required to properly dispose of the waste. However, in the modern
era no manufacturer could credibly claim that they were unable to properly dispose of waste because of a lack
of access to transportation.
Finally. the court examined whether or not one of the three statutory defenses applied to relieve the oil
companies from CERCLA liability. The only defense claimed by the companies was the "act of war" defense.
The court's discussion of the act of war CERCLA defense is the first appellate-level discussion of the issue.
The court ruled that the defense did not apply because the pollution was not solely caused by an act of war,
because the waste was the result of a contractual relationship between two consenting parties, and because of
the strict liability CERCLA attempted to impose.' The status of the phrase and concept "act of war" in
American jurisprudence is vague at best. Congress has not had occasion to define "act of war," or even "war."3
The closest that it has come is in the veterans benefits context when it defined periods of war by reference to
15 Id. at 1053.
56 Id. at 1048-49.
1 7 Pa. v. thnion Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (overturned on other grounds).
h8 46 F.3d 803.
15 Shell Oil Co.. 294 F.3d at 1062.
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specific dates and theaters of operation.' 60 There is also a dearth of judicial treatment of the issue, as previously
discussed, and the few cases that touch upon the issue do not lend themselves to CERCLA application.
The act of war defense may, unfortunately, become an issue in the foreseeable future. A terrorist attack
on American soil that releases hazardous materials into the environment may conceivably result in owner
liability for the entity that possessed the materials. Would a terrorist act constitute an act of war for CERCLA
purposes and release the victim of the attack from liability? An attack on an oil company's storage facility that
releases petroleum products into the environment is an example. The company is unquestionably the owner of
the waste, creating the possibility of liability. However, the discharge was caused solely by an act of terrorism.
Would this constitute an "act of war" relieving the company of liability? This question raises issues that far
exceed the scope of this note, but presents a very interesting problem.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Shell is a logical and proper approach to allocating financial
responsibility for what has been, and will certainly continue to be. a hotbed of CERCLA liability. Private
parties who voluntarily contract with the government should not evade liability simply because of their
relationship with the government, and those same parties should not be able to pass their liability to the
government simply because the government was the party contracting for the finished product.
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